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Abstract 
 
Exogenous shocks resulting from the death of household members, changing agro-
climatic conditions and financial loss can have both short-term as well as lingering effects on 
households. Many poor households in developing countries cope with these shocks through the 
out-migration of family members. Migration and remittances can serve to smooth consumption 
for households affected by adverse shocks as well as overcome liquidity constraints in order to 
finance long-term human and physical capital investments. The inflow of remittances from 
international (external) migration and their potential development impacts has captured the 
attention of researchers for some time. This is due in part to the sheer magnitude of these 
financial flows, which has dwarfed official development assistance in many cases (Maimbo and 
Ratha, 2005). While domestic (internal) seasonal migration is also an important livelihood 
strategy, the short and long-term impact of remittance flows from this channel has received less 
attention in recent research, particularly in Africa.  
  Several recent studies have investigated the determinants and effects of migration and 
remittances (M&R) in Africa (Azam and Gubert, 2005; Gubert, 2002; Dillon et al., 2010). 
Harrower and Hoddinot (2005) use data from northern Mali to test both the responsiveness of 
self-reported household coping mechanisms (including migration) to idiosyncratic shocks as well 
as the full-insurance hypothesis put forth by Townsend (1995). In this context, full insurance 
implies that household-level consumption should be perfectly correlated with aggregate 
consumption in the village (or other co-insurance group) but uncorrelated with household-level 
fluctuations in income. These studies conclude that the decisions to migrate and remit are indeed 
responsive to household risk and shocks. Azam and Gubert (2005) use household-level data from 
Western Mali, with a long history international migration to Europe, to test for moral hazard on 
the part of households “left behind”. They find that the more households are insured by migrants’ 
remittances, the less incentive those households have to work. 
  This study uses six periods of panel survey data spanning a decade (1996-1998 and 2005-
2006) on approximately 250 households in the arid Zone Lacustre (ZL) of Northern Mali.   
Households in the ZL rely primarily on rain-fed cereal production for their livelihood. Our 
objective is to evaluate both the short-run and persistent effects of migration and remittances—
which are hypothesized to contribute to both inter-temporal consumption smoothing and human 
and physical capital investment. This study expands upon the previous studies outlined above, 
but makes several important distinctions that help to improve our understanding of the impacts of 
M&R in Africa.  First, M&R decisions are both ex-ante and ex-post mechanisms to cope with 
observable and unobservable household shocks and therefore endogenous within the context of 
Townsend’s (1995) full-insurance hypothesis test.  We therefore pay close attention to the 
identification strategy of the parameters associated with these two key variables using an 
instrumental variable approach. Second, we recognize that households have different motivations 
for choosing seasonal versus long-term out-migration, and we estimate the different impacts of 
each.  Third, there are several reasons why we might expect to find that M&R result in 
diminished consumption smoothing across time. For example, remittances may lead to increases 
in overall income (and expenditures) or changes in the basket of food and non-food items 
consumed through increased direct or indirect exposure to alternative consumption habits. Either 
of these are avenues through which households may shift away from their village co-insurance 
group. Thanks to the structure of our data, we are able to analyze on the one hand whether 
consumption-smoothing trends for several categories of goods (non-food, food, and cereals) are 	 	 				
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comparable both prior to and following migration. We are likewise interested in the potential 
explanations for diverging trends and go on to examine the effect of past migration on the level 
of consumption for those same categories of goods.   
This study uses three approaches to evaluate the effects of remittances on households in 
Northern Mali.  First, in order to establish whether or not remittances are indeed responsive to 
household shocks, we first use both a linear and non-linear estimators to evaluate the 
responsiveness of remittances to current and lagged exogenous shocks (e.g. crop and livestock 
losses, household morbidity and mortality). Second, following Jalan and Ravallion (1998) we 
test the full-insurance hypothesis within a first-differenced framework. However, several of our 
key variables are endogenous to such a model potentially resulting in biased parameter estimates. 
We therefore adopt and an instrumental variable approach to identify the parameters associated 
with those key variables, with current and lagged environmental shocks, household size, seasonal 
rainfall variation and migrant network intensity as instruments for income, household size and 
migration duration respectively (deBrauw and Giles, 2008; Dillon et al., 2010; Munshi, 2003; 
Yang and Choi, 2007).  The third component of the analysis uses a similar IV approach to 
investigate on the one hand whether there are diverging trends in consumption smoothing b and 
consumption levels, more generally, before and after migration. 
Preliminary econometric results suggest that the probability of migrants remitting increases 
for female-headed households as well as for households experiencing health and income (crop) 
shocks. The level of remittances received is higher for female-headed households, for households 
experiencing the death of a family member and with livestock losses during the hungry season. 
Once we control for the endogeneity of the key variables in consumption smoothing equation, 
migrant-sending households are more able to self-insure than those without migrants. 
Households with long-term migrants are able to self-insure to the greatest degree.  These 
findings are reversed when we ignore the potential endogeneity of income, household 
composition and migration patterns.  This is likely because these variables are correlated with 
unobservable factors such as ability on the one hand and households’ ability to modify their size 
and composition by sending members away during periods of distress. We find that the patterns 
of consumption smoothing as well as the levels of consumption before and following migration 
vary considerable across goods. This provides some evidence that the role of village-level 
insurance mechanisms vary for a given household depending on whether they participate in 
seasonal or long-term out-migration or not.  
  The role of internal migration in the process of economic development in West Africa has 
received limited attention. In parts of Mali (namely the Kayes region) international out-migration 
is not just an important livelihood strategy, but in many cases, it is the livelihood strategy—
thereby undermining the development of the local economy. This research demonstrates that 
remittances sent through internal migration (which constitutes the bulk of out-migration from the 
Zone Lacustre) are indeed responsive to exogenous household-level shocks. In addition, we find 
that M&R play a role in short-run smoothing consumption but that the persistent effects of these 
activities on both consumption smoothing and consumption levels are more important, 
particularly for households with low purchasing power.   
 
I.  Introduction  	 	 				
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Life in developing countries is plagued by risk of many forms. In the absence of formal 
insurance or credit markets, households may participate in a host of risk coping mechanisms and 
adopt risk-mitigating strategies (Townsend, 1994; Paxson, 1992; Fafchamps, 1999; deBrauw and 
Giles, 2008 and Wouterse and Taylor, 2008). Most self-insurance approaches fall, very 
generally, under the rubric of household portfolio diversification strategies (Fafchamps, 1999) in 
an effort to reduce correlation between different income sources (Rosenweig and Stark, 1989). 
These include, but are not limited to, crop diversification (Hardaker et al., 1997), adoption of 
improved production technologies, and participation in off-farm labor activities (Reardon et al, 
1992). Households may likewise pool risk within a given co-insurance group. These include 
neighbors who can monitor behavior and therefore reduce moral hazard (Townsend, 1994; Jalan 
and Ravaillion, 1997; Azam and Gubert, 2005), members of the same ethnic group (Grimard, 
1997), and family members who are spatially dispersed through migration (Rosenweig and Stark, 
1989; Yang and Choi, 2007; Gubert, 2002).  
This paper investigates both the short and long run effects of migration and remittances as 
informal insurance mechanisms. We use the Zone Lacustre of Northern Mali, with its long 
history of both seasonal and long-term out-migration, as an example. Indeed, results from a 2002 
census noted that spatial movement (including migration) is an essential livelihood strategy 
given Mali’s geographic, environmental and institutional setting (MEF, 2002).  Although their 
study was descriptive in nature, one of the objectives was to understand the recursive 
relationship between migration and poverty. As alluded to by the 2002 study and noted by 
Hampshire and Randall (1999), there is no strong consensus about this relationship due large 
differences in migration motivation across West African households. Per capita household 
incomes in this landlocked West Africa country are low (less than two dollars per day) and 	 	 				
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potentially volatile following vagaries in weather and market conditions, amongst others. Recent 
examples of covariate shocks range from the commodity (including staple food) boom of 
2007/08, to pervasive locust infestations in 2005 and changes to climate conditions. Households 
likewise face idiosyncratic shocks such as crop failures, post-harvest crop losses, illness and 
death.  
Within this context, both seasonal and long-term out-migration are therefore means of coping 
with poverty and vulnerability. But, how effective is it as a consumption smoothing mechanism 
and for how long are its effects felt? Understandably, this may depend on the specific 
motivations of the household members’ out-migration as either a short run coping mechanism in 
response to a specific shock or as part of a long term livelihood strategy. In order to begin to 
answer this question, it seems fitting to first examine the extent to which migration remittances 
respond to household shocks; second, the extent to which seasonal circular migration versus 
long-run migration serve to smooth consumption; and third, the persistence of the effects of 
migration on consumption smoothing across time as well level and basket of goods consumed —
exactly what this paper seeks to accomplish.  
Although migratory behavior is felt in both the urban and rural milieus of Mali, this is a risk 
coping strategy that has been understudied in this part of the world in terms of both its direct 
effect as an insurance mechanism and its long-run effect on wellbeing.  Likewise, the 
motivations of migration are often treated as homogenous despite evidence from qualitative 
studies suggesting fundamental differences in short-run seasonal and long run migration 
(Hampshire and Randall, 1999; Findley, 1994). Reardon et al. (1994) and Barrett et al. (2001) 
investigate barriers to and the short run effects and rural non-farm as a risk-diversification 
strategy. Taylor and Wouterse (2008) and Azam and Gubert (2005) each investigate the effect of 	 	 				
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migration remittances on agricultural productivity. The latter conducted their fieldwork in the 
Kayes region of Mali and found evidence of moral hazard on the part of family members “left 
behind.” Gubert (2002) also uses evidence from the Kayes region of Mali, where overseas 
migration is pervasive, to investigate the responsiveness of overseas workers to household 
shocks through remittances. Harrower and Hoddinott (2005), in their own study of consumption 
smoothing in the Lacustre zone, investigate the entire menu of risk coping mechanisms and test 
for pareto-efficient risk allocation using the village as a co-insurance group.  
The present research is a deviation from these past studies in that it develops a risk theoretic 
model to examine the extent to which 1) spatial income diversification efforts insure again 
adverse shocks and 2) migration and remittances serve to smooth household consumption. Once 
the present analysis establishes that remittances indeed serve as a mechanism to partially insure 
against adverse income shocks, one can then establish whether it has a persistent effect on 
household wellbeing by testing for the long run effect of remittances on household consumption 
smoothing and consumption levels, more generally.  
   Understanding both the short-run and persistent effects of migration is important for the 
development community and to policy makers for several reasons. First, there is renewed policy 
interest in both the vulnerabilities facing households in developing countries as well as the 
breadth of risk coping mechanisms available to and adopted by rural agricultural households in 
response to recent agro-climatic shocks (locusts 2005, recurring droughts, desertification, land 
quality deterioration), price shocks (staple food price spikes of 2007/08) and morbidity, amongst 
others (e.g. SAP 2009).  There is also interest in understanding the long run determinants of 
education, health and more general welfare outcomes of rural households. This presents 
somewhat of a challenge then to Lipton and Ravallion’s (1995) proposition that policies to 	 	 				
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encourage migration away from high risk areas and toward low risk environments are less 
preferred than policies focused on the provision of risk reducing inputs such as irrigation and the 
introduction of relief works schemes. Indeed, is it possible that out-migration is, like cash-crop 
production in some settings, an intermediate step that allows households greater access to those 
and other forms of risk reducing inputs? 
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: First, is an overview of the 
theoretical framework used to evaluate the role of migration and remittances on short-run 
household welfare. This section also presents the estimating equations that serve as the basis of 
the empirical exercise. Second, is a presentation and discussion of the paper’s identification 
strategy. Third, is a description of the household survey and supplementary data, including 
descriptive statistics and some general trends. Fourth, is a discussion of potential robustness 
checks further support or challenge the initial estimation approach and results. In a final section, 
alternative approaches are presented for analyzing the long run effects of migration on household 
welfare.  
II. Conceptual and Econometric Model  
The objectives of this paper are three-fold. Very generally, this paper examines the risk-
sharing behavior of households in Mali. More specifically, it seeks to establish both the role 
remittances play as an insurance mechanism against adverse (income) shocks and their long run 
effect on household welfare outcomes. The empirical analysis in this paper is motivated by the 
well-cited result of risk pooling as the pareto efficient outcome within a particular co-insurance 
group (Townsend, 1994; Jalan and Ravallion, 1997; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Harrower and 
Hoddinott, 2003). Under perfect insurance, individual consumption does not depend on 	 	 				
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idiosyncratic variation of income or earnings, but rather the outcomes of the pool (Townsend, 
1994).  
Risk pooling can be achieved through informal insurance mechanisms such as transfers 
and gifts (in cash or in kind). In a developing country context where it is difficult to verify over 
long distances whether or not an income shock occurred, one might expect to see local informal 
co-insurance groups to dominate at the village level (Townsend, 1994). However, gifts, transfers 
and remittances can serve many other goals, resulting in co-insurance groups along ethnic ties 
(Grimard, 1997), through marriage (Rosenweig and Stark, 1989), across spatially disperse 
household members (Yang and Choi, 2007; Gubert, 2002; De Braw and Giles, 2008).  The latter, 
including both migration and remittances, is the focus of this research.  
Following Bardham and Udry (1999) and Fafchamps and Lund (2003) consider a stylized 
village where pareto-efficient allocation of risk is achieved, but where households have no access 
to storage or credit markets. There are N households in the economy indexed by i, T periods 
indexed by t and S states of nature occurring with probability s. Let   yistand cist represent the 
income and consumption of household i in state s during period t. Now suppose  each household 
with pareto weight i has a continuous and twice differentiable utility function u
i(cist), such that 
u
i’>0 and u
i’’<0, that is separable over time.  In a pareto efficient allocation: 








          i, j,s,t 
Under the equality in equation (1), transient changes in income are fully pooled across members 
of the said co-insurance group and so the only risk faced by the individual is faced by the group 
as a whole. Suppose also that household preferences can be characterized by the same constant 
absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function: 	 	 				
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(2)      ui(cist) 
1

cist e  
Following Mace (1991), Cochrane (1991), Altonji et al. (1992), Townsend (1994), and Bardham 
and Udry (1999) the present analysis applies this utility function to the pareto optimal condition 
in equation (1) to yield: 













 Variants of equation (3) have been used extensively to test for efficient risk sharing within a 
given co-insurance group (Jalan and Ravaillion, 1997; Grimard, 1997; Harrower and Hoddinott, 
2003). Our analysis will follow Yang and Choi  (2007) and re-write equation (3) to investigate 
the role that spatially dispersed family members and neighbors play in smoothing household 
consumption over time (a test of whether risk is shared in a pareto-optimal fashion within a given 
co-insurance group). 
(4)     cist  cst 
1

lni 1/2(ln1 ln2)   
Adapting the approach of Jalan and Ravallion (1998), equation (4) can be re-written in 
first differenced form as:  








l nivt  ivt  
where  Divt is a village-time dummy equal to one when j=v and k=t and zero otherwise,  yivt is 
income per capita, nivt is the household size and ivtis an unobserved independently distributed 
random variable with zero mean. In order to distinguish between differences in motivation for 
seasonal versus longer-term migratory behavior, we denote M
ivt
s is a binary variable equal to one 
when at least one household member migrates in seasonal “circular” migration and zero 
otherwise, while  M
ivt
l
  denotes long-term displacement of household members. In this 	 	 				
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specification, aggregate income risk at the village level (one co-insurance group) is captured 
through (interacted) village-time dummies, while extended-household idiosyncratic income risk 
is captured by both the binary migration variable and the interacted income migrant term. As 
discussed by Townsend (1994), if there is perfect insurance within the village, the changes in 
household specific income will have no effect on consumption after controlling for village level 
effects ( 0). On the other hand, if there is perfect insurance within the extended household, 
changes in household income (earned income and transfers) will have no effect on consumption 
after controlling for the effects of the household’s migrant network.    
After testing the full-insurance hypothesis, the analysis follows Gubert (2002), 
Fafchamps and Lund (2003) and Yang and Choi (2007) to understand (1) how risk is actually 
shared within spatially disperse migrant households and (2) the potential causes of departures 
from the fully efficient outcome.  More specifically, this portion of the paper seeks to investigate 
the extent to which household transfers serve to share risk.   Let TRist denote total household 
transfers. Transfers can be decomposed into   remittances from migrant workers and household 
members received by household i in state s during time t (rist) and other gifts and transfers from 
friends, extended family, and others (gist) such that consumption can be rewritten as: 
(6)     cist  yist TRist  where  
(7)   TRist  rist  gist 
Suppose also that, in the spirit of Paxon (1992) household income can be decomposed into 
permanent and transient components: 
(8)     yist  ˜  y  i zist 
Permanent income,  ˜  y  i, is unaffected by s or t and can be captured by an individual household 
fixed effect, i,  while transient income is captured by exogenous household-level shocks, zist. 	 	 				
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Substituting equations (4) and (6) into equation (3) allows us to express household transfers as a 
function of transient income, a household fixed effect, mean household consumption represented 
by the time effect, t and  ist, an unobserved independently distributed random variable with 
zero mean:  
(9)     TRist  zist i t ist 
Using the extended family and neighbors as our primary risk-pooling group, equation (7) can be 
used to test the extent to which transfers respond to adverse shocks such as illness, death of a 
family member, unemployment, flooding, pest-infestation, and livestock losses.  Given that these 
shocks are exogenous, equation (7) can simply be used as the basis of our empirical test of 
whether or not transfers by extended family and neighbors are indeed responsive to adverse 
income shocks by. Our estimating equation for this portion of the analysis will be equation (7) in 
first-differenced form:  
(10)   TRist zist  ist 
 
III. Identification strategy 
In the treatment of equation (10) where we examine the effect of transient income shocks 
on transfer behavior, the explanatory variables were considered exogenous and so equation (10) 
can be estimated more or less directly after appropriately specifying the conditional mean of the 
first-differenced dependent variable TRist.   Conversely, income, migration and household size 
are all endogenous in equation (5).  The following discussion will therefore focus on the 
identification strategy for this component of the analysis. The objective here is to identify 
exogenous variables, ivt , that are correlated with income, the decision to migrate, the migration-	 	 				
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income interaction term, and household size but uncorrelated with the error term in the structural 
equation of interest (equation 5).  
Following deBrauw and Giles (2008) and Yang and Choi (2007), current and lagged 
environmental shocks as well as lagged household size are used for identification (Jalan and 
Ravaillion, 1997). Specifically, current rainfall shocks are used as instruments for current income 
shocks, with the assumption that rainfall affects current consumption only through its impact on 
household income. This is a departure from strategy of Harrower and Hoddinott (2003) who use 
current livestock losses as instruments for household level income shocks.  K lagged rainfall 
shocks (t-k) are used as instruments for short-term migrations following Munshi (2001). This 
seems like a reasonable approach because of the lagged effect of shocks on migration decisions. 
For example, households cannot instantaneously adjust migration decisions to particular states of 
nature. Rather, after experiencing a bad crop as a result of poor rainfall in period t, it might take 
up to k periods to first identify where the migrant might relocate to and then collect the resources 
required to send someone away (Rozelle et al., 1999). Our identifying assumption here is that 
lagged rainfall shocks only affect current household consumption through household migration 
decisions. Given the observed role of migrant networks by anthropologists and geographers 
within the sub-region, both short-term and long-term migrant network intensity within a given 
village may serve as a reasonable instrument as well.  This could be captured by the percentage 
of surveyed households within a village participating in a given migration scheme— a proxy for 
migration network intensity.  The sum of the exogenous household shocks used in the previous 
discussion to explain household transfer behavior will be used as instruments for the migration-
income interaction term. Finally, following Jalan and Ravaillion (1997) this paper will use 
lagged household size as an instrument for current household size.  	 	 				
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In order to ensure these instruments are indeed valid, the first stage equation (reduced 
form model of our endogenous variables as a function of their instruments and other exogenous 
variables) will be estimated in order to empirically establish the correlation between these 
variables. Then, following the second step (be it via Two State Lease Squares, 2SLS, with 
optimal instrumental variables or a Control Function Approach, CF) we test the appropriate over-
identifying restrictions using the Sargan test.  
IV.  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
This section describes the data and sample construction and provides some descriptive 
statistics of the sample households. The empirical analysis uses household-level survey data 
collected in the Lacustre Zone of Northern Mali by researchers at the International Food Policy 
Research Institute between 1997 and 2006. 
2 This particular zone of Mali is fairly remote and 
agro-climatic conditions are severe. Indeed the survey data was originally collected under Projet 
du Développement de la Zone Lacustre to gain an understanding of the vulnerabilities 
households face and the coping mechanisms they adopt. Later rounds have focused on evaluating 
the impact of widespread irrigation investments within the zone under the Etude sur la Pauvreté 
et la Sécurité Alimentaire au Nord Mali 2006 (Dillon, 2008).  A modified stratified sampling 
scheme was adopted to capture the diversity of agricultural systems within the area (rain-fed, 
water-recession with ponds, and irrigated) resulting in a two-step sampling procedure (Harrower 
and Hoddinott, 2003). First, 10 villages were purposefully selected. Second, one-third of the 
households in each village were randomly selected resulting in a sample of 275 households. Over 
the course of the initial survey period, twenty observations were lost due to out-migration by the 
entire household (Christiaensen and Boisvert, 2000). Another twenty observations were lost 
																																																								
2	Luc	Christiaensen	and	John	Hoddinott	in	1997	and	1998	and	Andrew	Dillion	in	2006	and	2007.			 	 				
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(likely to due to outmigration) between the first and second survey data collection periods 
resulting in a six-period panel of 235 households.  
The first round of survey data was collected during the hungry season, immediately 
before the 1997 harvest. This was followed by a second round during the post-harvest period of 
the same year, a third during the quiet period between agricultural seasons in early 1998, and a 
fourth during a second hungry season in 1998.  Households were revisited a fifth and sixth time 
in 2006 (in February and August, respectively) within the context of a much larger household 
survey data collection effort throughout northern Mali to evaluate the impact irrigation 
infrastructure investments. Data collected include information on households’ composition, 
income earning activities (including shocks), assets, food and non-food consumption, as well as 
anthropometric information. Household level data was supplemented with some additional 
village-level data.  
  Cumulative seasonal atmospheric humidity measures within the zone from NASA LARC 
(2010) are used as a proxy for seasonal rainfall and used to construct the instrumental variables 
for migration decisions of household members. These are aggregated to coincide with the timing 
of the survey data collection. Our rainfall shock variable is defined as the difference between the 
cumulative level of atmospheric humidity of the current season and the average humidity of the 
same season during the previous five years.    
  Table 1 presents summary statistics from the first survey round for the initial 275 
households used in the empirical analysis. We first distinguish between migrant and non-migrant 
households. Migrant households are those with household members who have moved to either 
another a city within Mali, a neighboring country within the sub-region, or overseas in search of 
an alternative source of livelihood for at least one month of the survey recall period. The 142 	 	 				
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migrant households represent 52% of the sample. The education of the household head, land 
holdings, the value of weekly food consumption, and prevalence of gifts and transfers from non-
family members are similar across migrant and non-migrant households within the survey 
sample. However, while just 7% of non-migrant households have a female head, 13% of migrant 
households are female headed.  Second, the reported value of total assets is higher on average 
(327,385 FCFA) for non-migrant households than for migrants (300,577 FCFA).  Agricultural 
income during the first survey recall period is also higher on average for non-migrant households 
(113,898 FCFA) than migrant households (87,828 FCFA), as is the relative importance of 
agricultural income to total income.  Migrant households report higher education, health related 
expenditures and total net income.   A limited number of self-reported shocks are also presented 
by household type; including livestock deaths, crop losses and lost productive time due to illness. 
Thirty one percent of migrant households versus 26% of non-migrant households reported losses 
of livestock due to death or theft. Seventy-two percent of non-migrant households reported crop 
losses versus 83% of migrant households. Finally, 63 % of non-migrant households reported that 
at least one member lost productive time due to illness versus 55% of migrant households. 
The descriptive statistics presented in table 2 suggest some disparities between those 
households participating in domestic versus international migration. These are mainly with 
respect to the gender of the household head, assets, total net income, and average expenditures 
on health and education. Table 3 presents an overview of the distribution of migrant and 
remittance receiving households across agricultural production systems. Thirty percent of 
households in the irrigated agriculture zone were migrant-households versus 53 % in the rain fed 
agricultural zone and 56% in the zone where ponds (without flood control) are used. Just 9% of 
households within the irrigated agricultural production zone received remittances from migrant 	 	 				
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family members compared to 40% of households in the rain fed agricultural zone and 33% in the 
zone where ponds (without flood control) are used.  These results provide some support for the 
notion that household members may out-migrate in response to agro-climatic shocks but that the 
decision to remit depends on other important household characteristics.  
Monthly cumulative atmospheric humidity (our proxy for rainfall) for the survey region 
is presented in figure 1. This serves to illustrate the bimodal seasonality and high variability of 
rainfall for a given season across years.  One can see that the initial survey data collection period 
(1997-1998) was one of unfavorable rainfall conditions, immediately following a year of 
favorable conditions. It is therefore a particularly interesting period to test for household and 
community level responsiveness to adverse shocks and the extent to which these informal 
insurance mechanisms act as buffers.  
V. Results 
In this section we present our estimation results of equations (5) and (10).  We begin with 
a discussion of our results presented in table 4 of the determinants of household-level out-
migration. These results provide the basis of the reduced form out-migration model used as part 
of the identification strategy  for migration in subsequent sections of this paper.  As a result of 
the close proximity of households within the Zone Lacustre we are not able to use agro-climatic 
shocks (current deviation from a five year moving average). In order to create sufficient variation 
we interact household landholdings with our rainfall shock variable  to proxy for the household-
level intensity of a rainfall shock during given period. Our results suggest that after controlling 
for village-period specific effects,  female-headed housholds are more likley to participate in out-
migration and that village-level out-migration intensity (% of households with migrants during a 
given period; a proxy for  the effect of household social networks) positively influnce migration 	 	 				
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decisions. When we pool that data across periods, we find that sign of the effect of rainfall 
shocks  depend on the period in question. More often that not, current deviations have no 
influence on out-migration whereas lagged deviations negatively affect out-migration. One 
interpretation is that while households generally can neither forsee nor respond to weather 
outcomes immediately, good rainfall deviations keep potential migrants  at home while poor 
weather outcomes drive them away in search of alternative livelihood strategies. We likewise 
find that lagged rainfall deviations up to five periods are jointly significant across specifications. 
Overall, these results suggest that in addition to the many other factors that influence household 
decesions,  exogenous current and lagged agro-climatic shocks as well as village-level migration 
intensity have a statistically signficant influnce on household out-migration decisions.  
Next we present our findings of the determinatns of remittance in-flows for households in 
Mali’s Zone Lacustre. In table 5 we present our findings of the determinants of whether or not a 
household is a recipient of in-kind or in-cash remittance flows. In table 6 we present our findings 
of the determinants of the level of remittance in-flows. Remittance flows are only observed for 
households with migrants, thereby potentially introducing a source of sample selection bias into 
our results. We therefore use Hekman’s approach by first estimating a reduced form equation of 
the determinants of migration and generate the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR). Second, we include 
the IMR in our structural equation of interest. These results are also for the purpose of 
comparison. We generally find evidence in support of a sample selection.  
Our results indicate that female headed households  are most likely to receive transfers. 
We also find that whether or not a household receives remittance in-flows appear to be most 
responsive to health shocks ( current and  lagged morbidity and mortality) as opposed other 
sources of exogenous shocks that directly affect agriculural output and income (e.g. crop losses 	 	 				
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and livestock losses). These results suggest that migrants are responsive to a particular form of 
household shock (morbidity and mortaliy) which likely result in lost household productivity  and 
income— potentially placing the household in a precarious situation in both in the short and long 
run. If the remittance inflows are simply used to pay funeral and medical bills at the expense of 
other household needs, they may be serve to improve household welfare. If, on the otherhand, in-
cash and in-kind transfers are used to help households overcome  generally difficult times in a 
more general sense they may play an important role in household welfare in both the sort and 
long term (e.g. smooth consumption in the short run and overcome liquidity constraints to make 
important human capital investments in the medium and long term).  
We see a somewhat different story in table 6 where we present the findings of the 
determinants of the level of remittance in-flows defined as the value of the sum of in-kind and 
in-cash household transfers. After controlling for sample selection (remittance levels are only 
potentially observed for migrant households during a given period), we find that the level of 
remittances flows increases for female headed households across specifications. After controlling 
for houshold fixed effects, we find that remittances flows increase with landholding and with our 
indicators of migrants’ participation in entrepreneurial activities.   Furthermore, remittance levels 
appear to increase  following crop losses  (pre or post-harvest).  These results suggest that female 
headed households may rely on remittances as an important source of revenues across seasons. 
We also find evidence that the level of remittances flows respond to the agricultural activities of 
the household. For example, our results suggest that remittances  may be used to help make 
agricultural larger investments before or during the growing season (ex-ante risk coping). On the 
other hand, the results from our pooled OLS specification suggest that remittances flows increase 
with crop  loss tendencies (average crop losses over the entire study period). Therefore, whereas 	 	 				
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remittance receipts are driven by household morbidity and mortality, the level of remittance 
flows appear to be more closely linked to the income-generating activities of the household (ex-
ante or ex-post).  
  Our previous treatment of the determinants of out-migration as well as remittance 
receipts served as a first and second step in analyzing the main empirical question of interest in 
this paper:  do household-level outmigration and remittances receipts serve to increase the extent 
to which smooth household consumption over time?  As was presented in our discussion of the 
paper’s identification strategy, analyzing these effects are  complicated by the fact that on the 
one hand each of our independent variables of interest are endogenous. On the other hand, 
unobservable as well as time-invariant effects are likely to play an important role in how and to 
what extent household insure against income-based consumption risk in both the short and long 
term. In tables 7 and 8 we begin by ignoring these endogeneity issues and divide households 
into those with contemporaneous (current) out-migration and those who do not. We go on to 
correlate income and consumption (total weekly food and non-food consumption in real 
2000=100 FCFA terms) for each subgroup after controlling for household-level fixed effects.  
We find that when we consider earned income (on or off-farm)  alone, migrant 
households are better insured against income risk than non-migrant households. However, this 
reverses once we incorporate both earned and remitted income flows. Village and period level 
effects are jointly statistically significant and decrease the extent to which current income levels 
drive current consumption levels. These results generally indicate that non-migrant household 
consumption is better insured through the village-based co-insurance group than migrant 
households.  This story holds when we use the natural log of both consumption and income 
mesures, with one exception. Specifically, once we consider both earned and remitted income the 	 	 				
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percentage change in consumption levels associated with a one percent change in income is 
much higher than when we consider earned income alone for migrant households (.29 versus .25 
percent). This is suggests that remitted income flows may not serve to smooth consumption, but 
rather lead to an overall increase in both food and non-food consumption— a topic we will return 
to.  
The results presented in tables 9 and 10 explicitly include current household out-
migration as an explanatory variable in the test of full insurance (in level and log form, 
respectively). We do so within a first-differenced framework and therefore difference out all 
time-invariant effects that could influence changes in consumption over time. In columns I-IV of 
both tables we treat all variables as exogenous while the results in columns V-VII  were 
estimated using an instumental variable approach. More specifically, earned  as well as earned 
and remitted income, migration status, interacted income and migration status, household size (# 
of household member present, by head) and the number of household members with some 
education were treated as endogenous to our model. Our exogenous instrumental variables are 
current rainfall interacted with household landholdings, the deviation of currental rainfall from a 
five year moving average interacted with household landholdings, village migration intensity (% 
of households participating in out migration during a given period), lagged household size and 
village education intensity (% of households with at least member with some education), 
respectively.  
When we treat income as exogenous, we find that household consumption is better 
insured through both income and remittances than through remittances alone. However, neither 
current earned income nor income and remittances have as statistically signficant effect on 
consumption smoothing when we consider the level of total consumption and income using 	 	 				
	 20 	 	
instrumental variable methods. Household out-migration likewise has a negative and statistically 
significant effect on consumption only when it is treated as endogenous and village-period 
specific effects are ommited from the model.  One interpretation may be that the level of the 
change in consumption between periods is reduced (level) with changes in household out-
migration status. We also find that effect of household earned income (.74) is less than the effect 
income and remittances  (.88) on consumption for migrant households. Overall, this leaves us 
with a somewhat ambiguous description of the overall effect of migration on consumption 
smoothing over time when we consider the level of income and consumption.  
In  table 10 we present our findings using the natural log of total consumption and 
income. We find that when we omit village and period level effects, the change in earned income 
as well as earned and remitted income have the same effect  on consumption. The effect of 
migration as well as the interacted inome-migration term are only statistically significant when 
we consider both earned and remitted income and omit the village-period level effects. If we 
consider the average level of income and remittances, this results in near perfect consumption 
insurance  against fluctuations in income for migrant households (net effect of .02, versus .33 for 
non-migrant households). These results are consistent with the notion that through out-migration 
and remittance receipts households are not only better able to smooth their consumption over 
time, but that they may actually shift co-insurance groups altogether (away from village-level 
mechanisms  and towards spatially dispersed family members as a co-insurange group).  
VI. Robustness Checks  
This section seeks to evaluate the robustness of the results estimated using the methods 
outlined above. In Gubert’s (2002) examination of the relationship between income shocks 
(positive or negative) on remittance flows, the  author investigated several alternative 	 	 				
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specifications of the conditional mean of remittance flows— Tobit, Heckman’s 2-step procedure 
and Powell’s censored absolute least deviations, CLAD.  Yang and Choi (2007) explicitly test 
the validity of the exclusions restrictions that motivate their instrumental variable approach. 
Other authors have estimated alternative conditional mean effects across income levels (e.g. 
quantile or deciles).  The present discussion first focuses on alternative measures of household 
consumption that may be more appropriate in context of Mali’s Lacustre Zone: food 
consumption and staple food calorie consumption. In other words, do short and long-term 
migration and remittances receipts contribute to or detract from transient food insecurity.  
Figures 2 and 3 present average monthly  real  (2000=100) rice and millet prices at one of 
the Market Information System outposts located in the Lacustre Zone. This helps to illustrate the 
somewhat erratic nature of staple food prices over the course of a given year. This also provides 
some support for the idea that simply using the monetary (FCFA) value of consumption may not 
be sufficient to understand the mechanisms through which households are insured. Although the 
theory presented in section II predicts the income shocks and insurance groups will affect 
consumption (in terms of expenditure on food and both durable and non-durable non-food 
items), the difficulties and vulnerabilities of households to food insecurity in particular 
throughout the year is likely more relevant (Christaensen and Boisvert, 2000). In particular, 
households may sell the bulk of their  cereal crop immediately following harvest in order to pay 
off accured debts and then rely on thin rural cereal markets in order to purchase staple foods for 
the remainder of the year. If this is the case,  and esimate of the caloric consumption per 
household member may be a better indicator to use in our test of pareto efficient pooling of risk 
within a given co-insurance group. Therefore, the following robustness checks serve to evaluate 	 	 				
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whether migrants’ remittances play differential roles as households smooth food versus non-food 
consumption.  
In tables 11 and 12 we again treat each of our independent variables as exogenous and 
establish the correlation between income and food consumption changes for migrant and non-
migrant households during a given period. We find that for overall weekly food consumption 
(measured as the real, 2000=100, FCFA value of food), income and remittances do a better job 
of insuring again food consumption risk for migrants than earned income alone. However, we 
find that (after controlling for village and period level effects or not), the consumption of food 
for non-migrant households appear to be better insured than that of migrant households. These 
results are reversed when we consider the effect of different incomes streams on household 
calorie consumption from staple foods for our two subsamples. Indeed, it appears as though 
changes in earned income are transmitted to a much greater degree to changes in calories derived 
from staple foods for non-migrant households when we omit the village period-level effects from 
our estimated equation. Our results therefore suggest that when all of our explanatory variables 
are treated as exogenous, current non-migrants are better insured against changes in the monetary 
value of food consumption, the same is not true for number of calories derived from staple food 
sources.  
We now turn to the explicit test of the role of migration in smoothing food consumption 
shocks in the Zone Lacustre. In tables 13 and 14 we present our findings with respect to overall 
food consumption and cereal calories consumption, respectively.  These results, as they currently 
stand, support the notion that the natural log of household food consumption may be better 
insured through earned income and remittances than through earned income alone. This supports 
(albeit weakly) our earlier findings that are even further supported from our results with respect 	 	 				
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to weekly staple food calories consumed. Specifically, we find that overall, the food 
consumption of non-migrant households is better insured against income risk when we consider 
earned income within an instrumental variables framework (.16 and .70 overall effects of earned 
income from these two subgroups. This trend reverses when we consider the effect of both 
earned and remitted income flows on staple food caloric consumption. Indeed, the effects of the 
natural log of both income and remittances on cereal consumption are nearly zero for migrant 
households and .21 for non-migrants. These alternative specifications of household consumption, 
which relate directly to household food security and therefore wellbeing, suggest that remittances 
do play an important role is helping households smooth consumption overtime and that 
households participating in out-migration may actually be transitioning from one coinsurance 
group (village) to another (spatially dispersed household members). These results also indicate a 
possibility that households participating in out-migration may not smoothing consumption 
because they have increased food and non-food consumption overall. The next section will 
explicitly test whether our data from the Zone Lacustre convincingly support either of those two 
scenarios as two of the longer-term impacts of out-migration: increased consumption smoothing 
during the periods after migration and increases in the overall all basket of goods consumed.  
(which can also theoretically weaken village co-insurance mechanisms).  
VII. Evaluating the Long Run Effect of Migration and Remittances on Wellbeing 
  As discussed above, the third objective of this research is to investigate the persistence of 
informal household insurance mechanisms on household wellbeing. In recent work by Chauvet 
et al. (2009), the authors demonstrate with aggregate (national level) panel data that lagged but 
not contemporaneous remittances (as well as other explanatory variables)  improve child welfare  
(mortality). This is consistent with the notion that the process of migrating, establishing oneself 	 	 				
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in a host community and then sending money (or goods) home is not instantaneous. And, at the 
same time, the other, more general determinants of child welfare (including morbidity) 
accumulate over time. Therefore, the lagged or persistence of the effects of migration may be 
more appropriate to investigate in order to motivate future explicit studies of, say, the effect of 
migration and remittances on welfare indicators related to health, nutrition and education status.  
In other words, does consumption smoothing insurance through migration in period t (1997-
1998) have an effect on measures of households’ wellbeing in period t+n (2006)? And if so, what 
are the avenues through which this process occurs?  This is consistent with the notion that it may 
take several periods for a household to recover from a given (or a multitude of) adverse shocks. 
Therefore insurance against such setbacks may likewise have persistent effects. Migration may 
also have a lagged effect because of the dynamic nature of out-migration and the tendency for 
migrants to maintain strong ties with their home community and often return with important 
sums of cash and in-kind gifts once they move back to settle. Likewise, remittances may have 
other effects aside from allowing households to smooth consumption, such as overcoming credit 
constraints to make investments related to production agriculture or gaining valuable human 
capital through off farm work. Both may lead to long-term improvements in household 
members’ wellbeing.  
  Given the structure of the present survey data, it is possible to examine how spatially 
diversifying income through migration in this zone has affected policy relevant measures of 
wellbeing. First, we consider the persistence of the effect of migration  as it relates to household 
consumption smoothing (food both and non-food items). We do so by analyzing whether or not 
our data provide evidence that households that have previously  participated in migration are 
better able to smooth their consumption during later time periods.  As discussed above, this may 	 	 				
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occur through a number of avenues such as overcoming credit constraints to make long-term 
productive investments (in physical and/or human capital)  or by allowing households to over-
come and otherwise difficult periods and therefore avoid a poverty-trap type situation. On the 
other hand, it is possible that past migration does not contribute to improved consumption 
smoothing because consumption levels have  increased overall. Indeed, increased overall 
consumption would naturally lead us to reject a hypothesis of perfect insurance.  At the same 
time, increased consumption or a shift in the basket of goods consumed could drive households 
away from their village-level co-insurance group and therefore depend  to a greater degree on 
spatially distant household members.  
  Our results are presented in tables 15 and 16 in two separate formats that nonetheless tell 
us a similar story. In table 15, we again break our sample into those observations (by household 
and period) that have experienced past migration and those that have not. We again use first-
differences, which theoretically removes all time-constant factors from our estimating equation. 
These results generally tell us the same story across specifications (e.g. exogenous versus 
endogenous treatment of our explanatory variables): that, on average, households’ consumption 
is generally better insured following migration than before. Table 16 presents similar results, 
with the exception that past household migration status is explicitly included as an explanatory 
variable. Although the sign of past migration changes across specifications, we find no cases in 
which it alone is statistically significant. On the other hand, our interacted past migration status 
and income (earned and/or remitted) terms are negative in each model specification. This 
therefore further supports the findings in table 15 that households that had previously 
participated in out-migration were, on average, better able to smooth their (food and non-food) 
consumption following than before. Therefore, although our previous discussions focused on the 	 	 				
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role of contemporaneous (current) migration and remittances flows on smoothing household 
consumption between periods left us with somewhat ambiguous results,  the role of past 
migration on future consumption smoothing appears to be unambiguously positive. This is 
unsurprising in many ways as household out-migration  is itself  not instantaneous, nor are 
remittances receipts or the results of physical and human capital investments made as a result of 
this activity that accrue gradually over time. 
  Now, although we are primarily interested in the role of out-migration on consumption 
smoothing across time, our previous analyses and discussion suggest that it could have an 
important effect on the level of consumption as well. Table 17 presents basic descriptive results 
on the distribution of food and non-food consumption (real 2000=100  FCFA) before and 
following out-migration.  We find that on average consumption increases following out-
migration, however we see a slightly different story once we consider the distribution of 
expenditures across sub-samples. More specifically, we find that while both food and non-food 
consumption at the 25
th and 50
th percentile (median) increases following out-migration, the 
reverse is true for higher levels of the distribution (75
th and 90
th percentiles, respectively). 
Although these are only descriptive results, they do provide suggestive evidence that household 
out-migration has a persistent effect both on consumption smoothing and on the level of 
consumption, more generally. This appears to be especially the case among households with very 
low incomes and purchasing power.   
VIII. Discussion  
  This paper was motivated by some of the stylized that have been well established in the 
development economics literature: that life in developing countries is characterized by risk and 
uncertainty of many forms and that households can be quite resilient and innovative in 	 	 				
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responding to new conditions. In this paper we treat one such response, that of household 
member out-migration, which can be seen as both an ex-ante and ex-post coping mechanism. 
Our findings suggest that out-migration from our sample in Mali’s Zone Lacustre is itself driven 
by agro-climatic conditions on the one hand and social ties on the other. On the other hand, after 
controlling for sample selection bias, household remittance receipts are strongly driven by 
exogenous household shocks; morbidity and mortality in particular. We therefore have evidence 
that spatially dispersed household members indeed respond by sending money and in-kind 
transfer during times of difficulty. Although our results provide only weak evidence in support of 
the hypothesis that outmigration and remittances improve contemporaneous  (current) 
consumption smoothing across consumption baskets,  we find that is has a strong persistent 
effect. In many ways this is unsurprising as neither  migration nor remittances occur 
instantaneously. This is particularly the case for households participating in long-term migration, 
versus seasonal domestic out-migration. We would likewise not expect the effects of any 
physical or human capital investment made as a results of these activities  to take effect 
immediately. Finally, descriptive statistics  on the distribution of household consumption before 
and after migration indicate past migration positively effects consumption at the lower end of 
distribution while it negatively effects consumption at  the higher end of the distribution, and that 
the magnitude and percentage change is greatest in the case of the former. 
  Although the Zone Lacustre of Mali is a particularly difficult one to live in and size of the 
sample analyzed for this research is fairly small (250 households), there are at least two 
important policy implications that can be drawn from our findings and discussion. First, 
household out-migration is very common strategy, but both the short and longer-term impacts are 
not uniform across households. We have some evidence that past out-migration increases 	 	 				
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households’ ability to smooth consumption and that it actually increases the level consumed 
among the very poor. The financial sector can further facilitate this process by developing or 
supporting existing mechanisms through which migrants can quickly and securely remit funds. 
Second, we found that the effect of migration is not particularly strong in the short run, but its 
longer-term, persistent effects are. This along with a better understanding the interaction between 
the long-term effects of out-migration and household human and physical capital investments 
may have important implications the effective development and targeting of social safety nets for 
remote communities in Mali and across West Africa more generally. 	 	 				
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Figure 2: Monthly Average Real cereals prices (FCFA) Lacustre Zone (OMA, 2010) 
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XI. Tables 
 
Table1: Sample Household Characteristics in the Zone Lacustre  (Survey Round 1) 
Household Descriptives 1/ 
Migrant (n= 142)  Non-Migrant (n=133) 
Mean SE  Median  Mean SE  Median 
Household Members  6.3  3.8  6.0  5.5  3.4  5.0 
Gender of Household Head ( % female)  13%  --  --  7%  --  -- 
% of households in which the household head 
has some schooling  15% --  -- 16% --  -- 
Assets 300,577  411,712  184,038  327,385  632,183  171,625 
Household Land (ha)  4.2  5.2  2.6  3.8  5.2  2.1 
Household Total Expenditure (Nominal FCFA)  115,915  162,081  69,350  105,379  141,840  63,104 
Value of Weekly Household Food 
Consumption  12,098 7,720  10,330  11,644 6,509 11,062 
Value of Weekly Household Food Expenditure  9,158  6,167  7,613  9,377  5,383  8,773 
Net-Income 225,498  226,188  173,634  197,329  234,503  132,500 
Crop Income  80,538  109,396  49,250  101,403  162,041  53,300 
Livestock Income  7,290  28,383  0  12,466  45,049  0 
Non-Farm Income  72,379  102,822  44,000  84,582  136,687  49,000 
% Remittances in Total Income 2/  33%  23%  29%  0  --  -- 
Transfers Other Than Remittances (%Yes)  53%  50%  --  57%  50%  -- 
Average Role of Transfers other Than 
Remittances in total Income (%)  8% 15%  0% 7% 14% 1% 
Education Expenditures  418  4,619  0  196  1,292  0 
Percent of households with school age children 
with some schooling  20% --  -- 32% --  -- 
Health Expenditures  1,756  7,036  0  1,395  3,991  0 
Households that reduced children's food  
consumption as a coping mechanism  65% --  -- 68% --  -- 
% of Households with Livestock Deaths  31.0%  --  --  26.0%  --  -- 
% of Households faced with Pre- or Post 
Harvest Crop Losses  83.0% --  -- 74.0% --  -- 
% of Households with Lost Productive Time 
due to Illness  55.0% --  -- 63.0% --  -- 
Household experienced the death of a family 
member  5.0%    1.0%    
1/ Income, assets, expenditures and remittances are reported in nominal FCFA 
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Table 2: Sample Household Characteristics in the Zone Lacustre  (Survey Round 1) 
 
Domestic Migrant (n=117 )  International Migrant (n=43 ) 
Mean SE  Median  Mean SE Median 
Household Descriptives 1/             
Household  Members  6.5  3.7 6.0 6.6 4.0  6.0 
Gender of Household Head ( % female)  9%  --  --  14%  --  -- 
% of households in which the household head 
has some schooling  16% --  --  23%  --  -- 
Assets  299,262  436,240 164,600 360,325 544,365  184,425 
Household  Land  (ha)  4.5  5.4 3.0 3.6 5.0  2.5 
Household Total Expenditure (Nominal 
FCFA)  120,410 173,875 68,905 143,643  240,363  81290 
Value of Weekly Household Food 
Consumption  12,140 7,940  10,180  13,095  8,711  11708.85 
Value of Weekly Household Food 
Expenditure  9,268  6,512 7,600 9,684 5,670  8915 
Net-Income  221,148  210,863 175,200 298,497 322,902  215274 
Crop Income  84,253  115,374  51,469  100,614  140,137  78225 
Livestock  Income  7,362  29,591 0 11,221  34,791  0 
Non-Farm Income  68,935  95,846  46,375  86,653  109,664  45000 
% Remittances in Total Income 2/  32%  22%  30%  37%  25%  28% 
Transfers Other Than Remittances (%Yes)  50%  50%  --  53%  50%  -- 
Average Role of Transfers other Than 
Remittances in total Income (%)  7% 12%  0% 8%  17% 1% 
Education  Expenditures  486  5,085 0 1,380  8,383  0 
Percent of households with school age 
children with some schooling  18% --  --  23%  --  -- 
Health  Expenditures  1,433  6,661 0 2,435  6,802  0 
Households that  reduced children's food  
consumption as a coping mechanism  68% --  --  71%  --  -- 
% of Households with Livestock Deaths  35%  --  --  42%  --  -- 
% of Households faced with Pre- or Post 
Harvest Crop Losses  72% --  --  72%  --  -- 
% of Households with Lost Productive Time 
due to Illness  55% --  --  60%  --  -- 
Household experienced the death of a family 
member  3%     5%     
1/ Income, assets, expenditures and remittances are reported in nominal FCFA 
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Table 3: Migration and Remittance Distribution Across Agricultural Production Systems 
 Village 
# of Migrant 
Households        
(% of total) 
# Households 
with Remittances  










Ouaki 16  8  36  52 
  31% 50%     
Tomi 3  1  9  12 
  25% 33%     






Mangouro 18  12  11  29 
  62% 67%     
Gouaty 5  4  5  10 
  50% 0.8    
Ngoro 30  20  30  60 
  50% 67%     






Aldianaba 14  13  4  18 
  78% 93%     
Hamakoira 13  6  4  17 
  76% 46%     
Tomba 23  11  16  39 





Goundam 3  2  11 14 
  21% 67%     
Anguira 17  15  7 24 
  71% 88%     
Total    142 92  133  275 
 
Table 4: Determinants of Household Out-Migration 
MIGRANTS (Y/N)  Linear Probability Model 1/ 
Pooled Fixed  Effects  Dynamic Fixed Effects 
Female Headed Household  0.0419  0.0693*  0.0754** 
Village Crop Shock Intensity (%) -0.0390  -0.0456  -0.0297 
Village Illness Intensity (%) -0.107*  -0.0975  -0.152 
Village Livestock Loss Intensity (%)  0.187**  0.225**  0.160 
Village Out-Migration Intensity 0.0272***  0.0235***  0.0232*** 
Land*Rainfall Shock  1.05e-06*  -1.99e-05  2.65e-05 
Land*Rainfall Shock (t-1)  -2.69e-06**  3.77e-05  -1.40e-06 
Land*Rainfall Shock (t-2)  -1.03e-06*  8.26e-06  4.93e-05 
Land*Rainfall Shock (t-3)  -7.76e-07**  -8.47e-06  -1.92e-05 
Land*Rainfall Shock (t-4)  -4.04e-08  -2.39e-05  -3.10e-05 
Land*Rainfall Shock (t-5)  8.13e-07***  -1.32e-05  -3.40e-05 
Village Crop Shock Intensity (t-1)      -0.0876 
Village Illness Intensity (t-1)      -0.140 
Village Livestock Loss Intensity (t-1)      -0.00228 
Village Out-Migration Intensity (t-1)      0.00273* 
Constant 0.569***  0.260  0.279 
Observations 1,583  1,583  1,304 
R-squared 0.659  0.629  0.680 
F-test of the joint significance of agro-climatic shocks  5.33***  2.8*  13.32*** 
Clustered (village) robust standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
1/Includes interacted village and period level effects       	 	 				
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Table 5: Determinants of Receiving Remittances 
Remittances (Y/N)  Linear Fixed  Effects 
I II  III  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII  IX 
Female Headed Household  6.433*  6.250*  1.248  13.98  9.863  14.70  0.0902  0.137  0.0906 
Household Land (ha)  0.038**
* 
0.043**




* 0.000269  0.000292 
Household Deaths  0.873     
-
2.314*         
Household Members   0.241  -1.332  0.264  0.0396  0.292  0.00222  0.00289  -0.00202 
Household Illnesses  1.564**     
1.246*
*         
Household Death    6.273  3.362    0.443  -2.650  -0.0163  -0.0282  0.0213 
Household Illness    4.357*  6.621*    4.001  3.562  0.0305  0.0314  0.0722** 
Household Crop Loss    3.140  3.662    4.494 
5.392
* 0.0279  0.0375  0.00895 
Migrant Activity == Agriculture   
10.77**
* 4.429**       0.105*** 
0.0793**
* 0.0538** 





*     0.146***  0.123*** 
0.0955**
* 
Migrant Activity == Other    -1.031  -4.994**        0.00187  -0.0150  -0.0180 
Lagged  Death                0.0706* 
Lagged  Illness                -0.00780 
Lagged Livestock Loss                  0.0186 
Lagged Crop Loss                  -0.0393 






05       0.105*** 
0.0793**
*  




*     0.146***  0.123***   
Average Land  0.00971  -0.0216  -0.00837        0.00187  -0.0150   
Average Household Size  0.977  0.0497  1.951             
lambda 1/     
22.72**
* ***       *** *** 
Constant 
39.08**
* -0.0181  29.82**  29.77 
29.82**
* 22.58  0.228***  0.0655 0.170 
R-squared  0.151  0.270    0.182 0.135  0.183 0.209  0.225  0.241 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
258 Households, and 1485 Observations 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 















 	 	 				




Table 6: Determinants of the Level of Remittances Received (Real FCFA 2000=100) 
Dependent Variable =             
Total Remittances (Real) 
Pooled OLS  Fixed Effects 
I II  III  IV  V 
         
Female  Headed  Household  17,331* 20,548** 24,728* 24,659* 21,480* 
 (9,653)  (9,676)  (12,416)  -12223  (10,659) 
Household Land (ha)  4.320 10.21  425.4**  798.2***  737.2*** 
 (48.51)  (48.69)  (165.7)  -245.5  (215.2) 
Household Members   -847.6  580.2  -344.4  -555.9 
    -2171  (2,089) -2080 (2,117) 
Household  Deaths  4,386       
  (6,174)       
Household  Illnesses  1,872       
  (2,224)       
Values of Livestock Losses (Real)  0.104         
  (0.0843)       
Value of Crop Losses (Real)  -4.979*         
  (2.842)       
SICK_BAR  -7,380  -4,944     
  (6,079)  (5,767)     
LIVESTOCK_LOSS_BAR  -0.0318  0.0619     
  (0.140)  (0.133)     
CROP_SHOCK_BAR  34.23***  26.48***     
  (8.060)  (7.309)     
LAND_BAR  54.24  26.53     
  (136.0)  (135.9)     
COMP_BAR  3,405**  3,992     
  (1,332)  (2,644)     
Death of Household Member    -1,301  -8,445  6,583  6,892 
    (16,463)  (11,903) (11,668) (11,000) 
Household Experienced Illness    -6,618  -5,693*  1,413  771.1 
    (8,165)  (3,011) (1,682) (1,736) 
Household Experienced Livestock 
Loss   -1,149  1,526  -0.0345  -0.0223 
   (8,697)  (7,066)  (0.0853)  (0.0747) 
Household Experienced Crop Loss    118.4  384.6  -1.551  -0.829 
    (8,142)  (3,620) (4.772) (4.484) 
Migrant Activity == Agriculture    1,721      9,871 
   (4,471)      (8,326) 
Migrant Activity == Small 
Enterprise   15,930***      31,669** 
   (3,634)      (11,892) 
Migrant Activity == Other    -4,510      829.0 
   (4,709)      (4,462) 
Lagged  Death      -1,856  -1,757 
      (1,221)  (1,578) 
Lagged  Illness      914.5  337.7 
      (2,803)  (2,479) 
Lagged Livestock Loss        0.0233  0.0233 
      (0.101)  (0.0836) 
Lagged Crop Loss        -4.875*  -4.632** 
      (2.242)  (2.031) 
Lambda 1/  48,910***  52,565***  0.000***  0.0326**  0.0156 
  (9,035)  (9,117)     
Constant  56,984**  41,836  13,587 24,643 11,994 
  (27,511)  (28,059)  (19,329) (23,176) (23,883) 
Observations  1,485 1,485 1,442  1,187  1,187 
R-squared      0.056 0.076 0.117 
1/ for FE specification, the statistic presented is the p-value of test of joint significance of the period specific 
IMR   	 	 				
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Robust standard errors in parentheses           
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           	 	 				
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Table 7: Consumption Smoothing (Total Consumption) by Migration Status 
Dependent Variable = Total Weekly Expenditures  
(Real FCFA, 2000=100) 
Migrant Non-Migrant 
I II III  IV  V  VI 
Household Earned Income  0.26**  0.29**  --  --  0.19**  0.26*** 
 (0.11)  (0.11)      (0.08)  (0.07) 
Household Earned Income & Remittances --  --  0.19**  0.21***  --  -- 
     (0.06)  (0.06)     
Household Members  180.13  346.04 123.41 280.85  435.94  990.77 
  (478.10)  (577.76) (479.17) (585.43)  (523.77)  (670.95) 
Female  Headed  Household  -4,870.84**  -4,794.36** -5,201.76** -5,249.54**  -4,067.74  -10,310.55** 
  (2,065.12)  (1,751.27) (1,959.25) (1,694.22)  (3,154.89)  (3,512.75) 
 Village Period Effects  Yes  --  Yes  --  Yes  -- 
Constant -63.62  -734.64  -7,056.49***  -1,014.81  -56,714.73***  -2,377.99* 
  (539.03) (593.13) (1,559.39) (624.09)  (3,676.08)  (1,154.50) 
Observations  780  780 780 780  511  511 
R-squared  0.34  0.14 0.34 0.13  0.40  0.18 
Robust standard errors in parentheses             
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             
 
Table 8: Consumption Smoothing (Natural Log of Total Consumption) by Migration Status 
Dependent Variable =Natural Log of Total Weekly 
Expenditures  (Real FCFA, 2000=100) 
Migrant Non-Migrant 
I II III IV  V  VI 
Household Earned Income  0.25***  0.26***  --  --  0.16***  0.19*** 
  (0.04)  (0.04)    (0.02)  (0.03) 
Household Earned Income & Remittances  --  -- 0.29***  0.31*** --  -- 
     (0.05)  (0.05)    
Household Members  0.22***  0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22***  0.14  0.09 
  (0.06)  (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.10)  (0.09) 
Female  Headed  Household  0.21  0.27 0.22 0.26 -0.19  -0.18 
  (0.35)  (0.32) (0.32) (0.31) (0.24)  (0.16) 
 Village Period Effects  Yes  --  Yes  --  Yes  -- 
Constant -1.38***  0.01  -1.37***  0.03  -1.82**  -0.23** 
  (0.25)  (0.06) (0.25) (0.06) (0.70)  (0.09) 
Observations  780  780 780 780 511  511 
R-squared  0.37  0.29 0.35 0.26 0.40  0.18 
Robust standard errors in parentheses             
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             
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Table 9: Effect of Migration on Consumption Smoothing 
Dependent Variable = Total Weekly 
Consumption   (Real FCFA, 2000=100) 
First-Differenced First-Differenced  and  IV 
I  II III  IV V VI  VII  VIII 
Household Earned Income  0.15***  0.18***  --  --  0.12  -0.07     
  (0.05)  (0.04)    (0.48)  (0.18)    
Household Earned Income & Remittances --  --  0.12***  0.11***      0.02  -0.17 
     (0.04)  (0.04)    (0.33)  (0.16) 
Migrant (Yes or No)  -1,428.22  -373.07  -1,549.72  -902.32  1,899.78  -5,833.94**  1,329.89  -6,641.84*** 
 (1,013.63)  (996.36)  (1,008.05)  (985.66)  (3,591.21)  (2,346.24)  (2,802.80)  (2,037.65) 
Migrant * Earned Income  0.13**  0.21***  --  --  0.09  0.74***     
  (0.05)  (0.05)    (0.56)  (0.25)    
Migrant * Earned Income and Remittances  --  --  0.12**  0.24***      0.20  0.88*** 
     (0.06)  (0.06)    (0.45)  (0.25) 
Household Members  299.66 502.23** 272.51 481.39** -483.03  480.18*  -479.23 532.90** 
  (234.40) (242.86) (234.84) (243.92) (544.18) (257.47) (545.17) (265.25) 
Household Members with Some Education  164.62  122.61 188.76 137.47  15,956.94*  945.07  16,026.09*  871.04 
 (537.80)  (533.06)  (537.94)  (534.77)  (9,139.98)  (1,232.26)  (9,420.39)  (1,243.92) 
Female  Headed  Household  -3,841.73** -4,700.97** -4,024.31** -4,941.09** -6,457.65**  -4,114.64*  -6,441.46**  -3,864.78* 
  (1,912.61) (2,069.26) (1,914.91) (2,076.35) (2,906.98) (2,198.24) (2,923.09) (2,231.01) 
Village Period Effects  Yes  --  Yes  --  Yes    Yes   
          
Constant -2,129.80  103.36  -2,143.08  95.97  110.74  193.98  118.90  214.66 
  (1,777.41) (485.22) (1,778.01) (486.83) (2,843.07) (517.74) (2,852.59) (521.94) 
Observations  1,291 1,291 1,291 1,291 1,291 1,291 1,291 1,291 
R-squared  275 275 275 275 275 275 275 275 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
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Table 10: Effect of Migration on Consumption Smoothing 
Dependent Variable = Natural Log Total 
Weekly Consumption   (Real FCFA, 2000=100) 
First-Differenced  First-Differenced  and IV 
I II  III  IV  V VI  VII  VIII 
Natural Log Household Earned Income  0.25***  0.31***     0.26 0.33***    
 (0.01)  (0.01)      (0.32)  (0.12)    
Natural Log Household Earned Income & 
Remittances 
   0.26*** 0.29***     0.36 0.33*** 
   (0.02) (0.02)     (0.27) (0.11) 
Migrant  (Yes  or  No)  0.27* 0.16  0.37 -0.21 -2.62 -1.10 -2.35  -2.49* 
  (0.15) (0.14) (0.25) (0.26) (3.08) (1.37) (3.69) (1.44) 
Migrant *Natural Log Earned Income and 
Remittances 
   -0.02 0.04 0.57 0.21 0.34  0.30* 
   (0.02) (0.02) (0.50) (0.21) (0.44) (0.16) 
Household Members  0.18***  0.11***  0.18***  0.11*** 0.06 0.14*** 0.00  0.09** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.12) (0.03) (0.14) (0.04) 
Household Members with Some Education  0.10 0.14* 0.09 0.14* 2.39 0.32* 3.19  0.62*** 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (1.71) (0.17) (2.07) (0.20) 
Female  Headed  Household  -0.01 -0.06 -0.03 -0.07 -0.46 0.19 -0.58 -0.05 
  (0.30) (0.32) (0.30) (0.32) (0.51) (0.30) (0.55) (0.36) 
Village Period Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
          
Constant 0.16  -0.39***  0.15  -0.42***  0.87*  0.15**  0.86  -0.27*** 
  (0.27) (0.08) (0.27) (0.08) (0.47) (0.07) (0.52) (0.10) 
Observations  1,291 1,291 1,291 1,291 1,291 1,291 1,291 1,291 
R-squared  275 275 275 275 275 275 275 275 
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Table 11: Consumption Smoothing (Food Consumption) by Migration Status 
Dependent Variable = Natural Log Total Weekly Food 
Consumption   (Real FCFA, 2000=100) 
Migrant Non-Migrant 
I II  III  IV  V  VI 
Household Earned Income  0.25***  0.28***      0.09***  0.15*** 
  (0.06)  (0.07)    (0.03)  (0.03) 
Household Earned Income & Remittances  --  -- 0.24***  0.27*** --  -- 
     (0.06)  (0.07)    
Household Members  0.13*** 0.13** 0.13*** 0.13**  0.08  0.02 
  (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.10) (0.10) 
Female  Headed  Household  -0.31** -0.26* -0.32** -0.26*  -0.06  -0.06 
  (0.11) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.21) (0.19) 
 Village Period Effects  Yes  --  Yes  --  Yes   
        
Constant  0.05 0.19** 0.13 0.16** -0.03 -0.05 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) 
Observations  762 762 762 762 490 490 
R-squared  0.27 0.17 0.26 0.17 0.38 0.11 
Robust standard errors in parentheses        
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Table 12: Consumption Smoothing (Staple Food Calories) by Migration Status 
Dependent Variable = 




I II  III  IV  V  VI 
Household Earned 
Income    3.81  6.95***  4.73  16.97** 
     (2.28)  (1.78)  (6.49)  (6.98) 
Household Earned 
Income & Remittances  1.99  4.52***        
 (1.27)  (1.16)        
Household Members  96,278.86*** 117,979.52***  97,051.00***  119,949.20***  47,596.64  135,288.24** 
  (14,616.53)  (21,787.46) (14,954.05) (21,836.02)  (38,480.65) (42,164.13) 
Female Headed 
Household  -409,470.19  -350,953.31 -407,931.00 -340,841.41 345,653.51** 272,265.09 
  (244,191.41)  (210,438.23) (245,612.60) (210,800.42)  (135,194.45) (187,824.30) 
Joint Significance of 
Village Period Effects  Yes  --  Yes  --  Yes -- 
          
Constant -419,504.01***  -154,724.89**  -0.46***  -0.09** 826,480.53***  -84,584.58 
 (64,158.99)  (51,422.05)  (0.07)  (0.04)  (92,887.41)  (141,574.57) 
Observations  687  687 687 687  461 461 
R-squared  0.31  0.07 0.28 0.10  0.21 0.06 
Robust standard errors 
in parentheses             
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 














 	 	 				
	 45 	 	
 
Table 13: Effect of Migration on Food Consumption Smoothing (Real 2000=100 FCFA) 
Dependent Variable = Total Weekly Food 
Consumption   (Real FCFA, 2000=100) 
First-Differenced  First-Differenced  and IV 
I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII 
Household Earned Income  -0.03  0.04      0.08  0.17     
 (0.04)  (0.04)      (0.46)  (0.16)     
Household Earned Income & Remittances     -0.03  0.03     0.03  0.11 
     (0.04)  (0.04)      (0.53)  (0.16) 
Migrant (Yes or No)  -1,567.28  -1,357.73  -1,557.45  -1418.05  5,958.66  621.67  5,554.34  -281.93 
 (964.21)  (918.91)  (973.75)  -933.67  (4,709.90)  (2,358.41)  (4,525.95)  (2,327.46) 
Migrant * Earned Income  0.06*  0.04      -0.35  -0.28     
 -0.03  -0.03      (0.45)  (0.19)     
Migrant * Earned Income and Remittances      -0.03  0.03      -0.31  -0.23 
     (0.04)  (0.04)      (0.61)  (0.22) 
Village Period Effects  Yes  -- Yes  --  Yes  --  Yes  -- 
                
Constant -279.28  830.33*  -268.12  824.79*  1,437.41  584.64  1,384.93  579.81 
 (1,620.79)  (445.19)  (1,620.85)  (445.27)  (2,861.54)  (476.22)  (2,801.17)  (469.93) 
Dependent Variable = Natural Log Total 
Weekly Food Consumption   (Real FCFA, 
2000=100) 
First-Differenced  First-Differenced  and IV 
IX  X  XI  XII  XIII  XIV  XV  XVI 
Natural Log Household Earned Income  0.21***  0.23***     0.02 0.24*    
 (0.03)  (0.02)      (0.30)  (0.13)    
Natural Log Household Earned Income & 
Remittances 
   0.16***  0.17***     -0.02 0.20** 
   (0.02)  (0.02)     (0.25) (0.10) 
Migrant (Yes or No)  0.46*  0.06  0.41  -0.08  -5.14*  -2.30  -6.50**  -1.99 
 (0.25)  (0.24)  (0.25)  (0.25)  (2.97)  (1.52)  (3.30)  (1.40) 
Migrant * Natural Log of Earned Income  -0.03  -0.01      0.84*  0.33     
 (0.03)  (0.03)      (0.45)  (0.22)     
Migrant *Natural Log Earned Income and 
Remittances 
   -0.02  0.00      0.77**  0.20 
   (0.02)  (0.02)      (0.37)  (0.15) 
Village Period Effects  Yes  -- Yes  --  Yes  --  Yes  -- 
                
Constant 0.25  0.11*  0.09  0.23  0.57  0.20**  0.50  0.16** 
 (0.25)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.25)  (0.43)  (0.08)  (0.47)  (0.08) 
Observations 1,252  1,252  1,252  1,252  1,252  1,252  1,252  1,252 
Robust standard errors in parentheses                
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                
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Table 14: Effect of Migration on Staple Food Consumption Smoothing (Calories from Staple Foods) 
Dependent Variable = Total Weekly Calories from 
Staple Foods    (Real FCFA, 2000=100) 
First-Differenced  First-Differenced  and IV 
I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII 
Household Earned Income  4.11  13.54***      22.01  18.93     
 (3.86)  (3.47)      (29.51)  (13.49)     
Household Earned Income & Remittances     2.26  11.78***     -36.15 6.67 
     (4.10)  (3.72)      (36.36)  (14.94) 
Migrant (Yes or No)  -124,595.99  -2,845.56  -131,491.10  -9,149.55  32,218.08  -132,882.98  -372,372.10  -295,284.72 
  (94,759.63) (87,196.98) (95,807.85) (88,931.81)  (307,885.70)  (215,995.79)  (318,314.13)  (221,846.94) 
Migrant * Earned Income  -0.46  -2.77      -14.29  1.98     
 (3.21)  (3.15)      (29.11)  (16.40)     
Migrant * Earned Income and Remittances      0.09  -4.97      44.43  13.40 
     (4.42)  (4.22)      (41.46)  (19.85) 
Village Period Effects  Yes  --  Yes  -- Yes -- Yes -- 
Constant  -301,678.30** -97,211.69** -303,668.04** -99,198.36** -215,004.17 -98,180.96** -230,465.65 -98,993.50** 
  (151,410.68)  (42,091.03)  (151,455.61)  (42,185.45) (182,545.42) (43,185.03) (185,437.27) (43,784.72) 
Dependent Variable = Natural Log Total Weekly 
Food Consumption   (Real FCFA, 2000=100) 
First-Differenced  First-Differenced  and IV 
IX  X  XI  XII  XIII  XIV  XV  XVI 
Natural Log Household Earned Income  -0.00  0.03**     0.06 0.16***    
 (0.01)  (0.01)      (0.08)  (0.06)    
Natural Log Household Earned Income & Remittances 
   -0.00  0.04***     0.08 0.21*** 
   (0.01)  (0.01)     (0.11) (0.08) 
Migrant (Yes or No)  -0.31**  -0.05  -0.22  -0.04  -0.35  2.60***  -0.36  2.17** 
  (0.12) (0.13) (0.17) (0.17)  (1.08)  (0.92)  (1.04)  (0.94) 
Migrant * Natural Log of Earned Income  0.01  -0.01      0.01  -0.29***     
 (0.01)  (0.02)      (0.12)  (0.09)     
Migrant *Natural Log Earned Income and Remittances 
    -0.02  0.00    0.02  -0.33** 
   (0.02)  (0.02)      (0.15)  (0.13) 
Joint Significance of Village Period Effects  Yes -- Yes --  Yes  --  Yes  -- 
Constant  -0.18 -0.08** -0.18  -0.06*  -0.09 -0.07 -0.08 -0.06 
  -0.11  (0.03)  (0.12)  (0.03) (0.14) (0.04) (0.14) (0.04) 
Observations  1,148 1,148 1,148 1,148  1,148  1,148  1,148  1,148 
Robust standard errors in parentheses              
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1              
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Table 15: Consumption Smoothing by Previous Migration Status 
Dependent Variable: First Difference of  Real Household Total 
Food and Non-Food Consumption (FCFA, 2000=100) 
I II  III 
Before After Before After Before After 
        
First Differenced Real Household Earned Income (Exogenous)  0.23***  0.16***         
  (0.08)  (0.04)      
First Differenced Real Household Earned Income (Endogenous)      0.23***  0.17***     
     (0.08)  (0.04)    
First Differenced Real Earned Income and Remittances 
(Endogenous)       0.21***  0.12*** 
       (0.08)  (0.03) 
Constant  -788.49 1,112.11  1,077.58 -945.05 1,008.57 -939.49 
  (2,115.71) (5,140.57) (5,152.94) (2,137.12) (5,155.33) (2,140.30) 
Observations  721 721 193 715 193 715 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
All specifications include village and period level effects 
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Table 16: Effect of Past Migration on Consumption Smoothing  
Dependent Variable = Total Weekly 
Consumption   (Real FCFA, 2000=100)  
First-Differenced   First-Differenced  and IV  
I  II III  IV  V VI  VII  VIII  IX X XI  XII 
Household Earned Income  0.35***  0.48***  0.35***  0.52***       0.35***  0.48***  0.20***  0.32***      
   (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)       (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.03)      
Household Earned Income & 
Remittances           0.31***  0.40***           0.31***  0.40*** 
            (0.05)  (0.05)           (0.05)  (0.05) 




















Migrant * Earned Income   -0.20***  -0.22***  -0.14*** 
-
0.20***       -0.20***  -0.22***          
   (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.05)  (0.05)       (0.07)  (0.07)          
Migrant * Earned Income and 
Remittances            -0.18***  -0.19***           -0.18***  -0.19*** 
            (0.05)  (0.06)           (0.05)  (0.06) 
Household Members  483.81** 449.03* 532.62**  456.57* 462.08*  433.69* 479.78** 434.39* 481.41**  408.80  458.20*  417.89 
    (239.20) (257.68) (245.90)  (263.99)  (238.66) (259.59) (239.44) (258.01) (240.42) (258.95) (238.90) (259.90) 
Household Members with Some 
Education    19.33 -27.99 -32.83  -45.78  26.00 -19.54 20.50 -27.01 34.23  18.67  27.14 -18.40 
    (524.36) (527.56) (554.02)  (563.40)  (523.29) (531.26) (524.57) (527.51) (526.70) (529.49) (523.50) (531.17) 
Village and Period Effects  Yes  --  Yes --  Yes  --  Yes  -- Yes  -- Yes  -- 
                              
Constant  -882.82 -983.24* -841.58 -1,043* -770.63  -718.89  -886.37 -967.65* -826.93 
-














Observations  1,016 1,016  959  959 1,016 1,016 1,015 1,015 1,015 1,015 1,015 1,015 
Robust  standard  errors  in  parentheses                    
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Table 17:  Consumption Levels Before and After Migration for Food and Non-Food Items (Real 
2000=100 FCFA)  
 All  Items  Food 
  Before  After   Before  After  
Mean   17755.76  18168.77  14609.28  15162.73 
        
25th Percentile   6747.79  8765.542  6709.5  7526 
        
50th Percentile   14052.4  14830.13  12055.73  12414.94 
        
75th Percentile  25341.62  23012.48  19610.65  19447.47 
        
90th Percentile   37099.17  34407.86  29128.05  26598.38 
        
Observations   334  977  319  958 
 